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Abstrak
Desentralisasi yang dilaksanakan di Indonesia sejak tahun 1998 menyebabkan kenaikan angka illegal logging pada
hutan Indonesia. Illegal logging tidak hanya menyebabkan kerugian pada lingkungan tapi juga pada kegiatan
ekonomi. Indonesia sebagai negara dengan hutan terbesar ketiga di dunia, sebagian besar pendapatan
penduduknya bertopang pada hasil hutan kayu dan non-kayu. Kegiatan illegal logging akan memberikan kerugian
ekonomi pada pemerintah dan juga masyarakat sekitarnya. Illegal logging di era desentralisasi salah satu
penyebabnya adalah peraturan yang tumpang tindih. Peraturan menyebabkan meningkatnya biaya produksi
terutama biaya tetap.
Abstract
Decentralization is implemented in Indonesia since 1998 led to a rise in the illegal logging in Indonesia's forests.
Illegal logging not only cause harm to the environment but also on economic activity. Indonesia as the country with
the third largest forest in the world, most of the income of the population relies on timber and non-timber. Illegal
logging activities will provide economic losses to the government and also the surrounding community. Illegal
logging in a decentralized one reason is regulatory overlap. Regulation led to increased production costs, especially
fixed costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Decentralisation is a transferring
considerable degree of administrative and
regulatory authority from the national
government to the country’s province and
district government. This process has been
occurred in Indonesia since 1998.
Decentralisation has been driven by the
demands of provincial and district
government who has rich jurisdiction. They
are complained that the vast majority of the
benefits go to the national government and
to private sector. The legislation of the
transferring are the law 22 on regional
governance, law 25 on fiscal balancing, and
the specific decentralisation, law 41 of 1999
about Indonesia’s basic forestry law.
The manner in which
decentralization affects forest management,
community livelihoods, and economic
development is a particular significance in
Indonesia due to the scale and importance of
the country’s forest resources. Indonesia has
the world’s third largest tract of tropical
forest, after Brazil and Congo. In 1997, the
country’s total forest cover was officially
estimated by 100 millions hectares (the state
of forest Indonesia). About 20 million
Indonesian people, their live depends to the
forest and the non-timber forest product.
Timber gives very big revenue for the state.
People used the timber for the paper
industry. As the data provide by the State of
Indonesian Forest tells that about in 1997
about 3,9 % of the GDP is from the timber,
or almost a half from the value of oil and gas
export, and equal to 10 % export earning.
Over the century ago Indonesia
forest cover by 170 million hectares, today
98 million ha. It means that almost a half of
Indonesian forest being degradated.
Indonesia lost its 17 % forest by 1985 - 1997
with average 1 million ha per year. Over that
time is a Soeharto`s regime. Much of the
policies at that time give permission to
exploit the large size of the forest. Most of
the timber company belongs to the Soeharto
families and his cronies. FAO study found
there has been a marked increase in the
extent and rate of Indonesia forest cover. At
1990, FAO study found that Indonesia forest
cover has been reduced from 74% until 56%
in the space years 30–40 years. It is
conclude that the lost of Indonesia forest
cover is because of the growth of timber
industry. Another source provides the data
that shown the linkages between the lost of
Indonesia forest cover with the growth of
population density.
Before the country’s entered the
decentralization process, in late 1998,
Indonesia’s forestry sector had entered a
period of crisis. From the mid 1980,
deforestation estimated by 1.6 million
hectares per year.  As we mentioned above
that deforestation driving by the
overcapacity in the nation’s wood
processing industries. At the mid 1990s,
Indonesia sawn wood, plywood, and pulp
industries are estimated to have consumed
60-80 million cubic meters of wood per
year. With few effective legal structures in
Indonesia’s forestry sector, domestic
demand for timber has resulted in large
volumes of wood domestic demand for
timber has resulted in large volumes of
wood being harvested from illegal sources.
Illegal logging can be defined as the
harvesting of logs in contravention of laws
and regulations. These laws and regulations
were designed to prevent the over
exploitation of forest resources and to
promote sustainable forest management. In
accordance to this definition, illegal may
include logging activities in protected area,
the logging of protected species, logging
outside concession boundaries, extraction of
more than allowable harvest, removal of
oversized or undersized trees, and harvesting
in areas where extraction is prohibited such
as catchments areas, step slopes and river
banks. In the current era of economic and
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political change in Indonesia, illegal logging
may also refer to an array of extractive
activities that have some degrees of legal
recognition, primarily as small-scale
concession allowable under the current
decentralization laws, or as logging practice
legitimize through district regulations. In
accordance to the last definition, some
logging activities may be considered to be
“illegal” by the central government, but
“legal” according to some district
governments. The distinction between
“illegal” and “legal” is therefore blurred
making it extremely difficult to define either
activity.
Table 1. Forest Area and Deforestation, 1985-1997 (GFW Estimates)
Source: The State of the Forest; Indonesia, 2002
The state of the Forests: Indonesia, noted
that illegal logging as an emotive term that
requires some definition. It uses the terms of
forestry practices or activities connected
with wood harvesting, processing, and trade
that do not conform to Indonesian law.
There are essentially two kinds of illegal
logging. The first is carried out by legitimate
operators who violate the terms of their
licenses. The second involves outright
timber theft, whereby trees are felled by
people who have no legal right to cut trees at
all.
Data collection and analysis by the
Natural Resource Management (NRM)
Program of USAID focused on the wood
intake and production of Indonesia’s
sawmills and plywood plants. One
conclusion was that any discussion of
industry overcapacity and the link to illegal
logging must recognize that “illegal
logging” can take many forms beyond the
illegal removal of trees from the forest.
Examples can be found in the forest
concession (HPH) system and the industrial
plantation (HTI) system.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL
LOGGING TO THE ECONOMIC
Decentralization and regional
autonomy allowed district government to
take benefit from natural resources,
especially forest. For that need, the district
government has to make their own rules to
regulate the system of forest exploitation.
But the problems in doing this is the
capability of the institution still low. The
1985 1997
Island
Land Area
(Ha)
Forest cover
(Ha)
Forest
as %
Land
area
Land Area
(Ha)
Forest
Cover
(Ha)
Forest
as %
Land
Area
Forest
Change
1985-1997
(Ha)
Forest
Change
(%)
Sumatera 47,581,650 22,938,825 48 47,574,550 16,430,300 35 -6,508,525 -28
Java 13,319,975 1,274,600 10 13,315,550 1,869,645 14 595,075 47
Bali 563,750 96,450 17 563,150 76,700 14 -19,750 -20
Nusa
Tenggara 6,645,625 686,775 10 6,639,925 450,450 7 -236,325 -34
East Timor 1,498,500 374,400 25 1,497,525 9,850 1 -364,550 -97
Kalimantan 53,721,675 39,644,025 74 53,721,225 29,637,475 55
-
10,006,550 -25
Sulawesi 18,757,575 11,192,725 60 18,753,025 7,950,900 42 -3,242,050 -29
Maluku 7,848,175 5,790,800 74 7,846,600 5,820,975 74 30,175 1
Irian jaya 41,405,500 35,192,725 85 41,403,850 33,382,475 81 -1,810,250 -5
Total 191,342,425 117,191,325 61 191,315,400 95,628,770 50
-
21,562,750 -18
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officer has low education level that needs
some roles from central government to
increase their capacity building.
There is some approach which
district government attempt to increase their
revenue is by generating a new investment.
In Kalimantan, district government
generating new investment by giving some
concession to the log firm. This concession
we called with IPPK (Timber extraction and
Utilization Permits), which the logging
company has to pay some taxes to the
district government. But the problem rose by
doing this project is many logging company
do their activities not in line with the area
agreed at the concession. This practice
caused the overexploitation to the forest.
The data shows, at the era where the
concession gives by the district government
to the logging company, the area of forest
cover increase. The failure on this program
emerges due to the weaknesses of district
institution to manage the forest.  They
supposed to take some monitoring activity to
control the program performance.
According to the article wrote by
William D. Sunderlin and Ida Aju Pradnja
Resosudarmo, some concessionaries fail to
manage their site appropriately, and have no
view to long term investment, due to:
1. The method of the concession
allocation gives too much land to
concessionaries. Certain
concessionaries thus have low
incentives to prevent encroachment
by small-holders, or are unable to
stop such encroachments. The timber
royalty fees in Indonesia are based
largely on the volume of extraction
rather than on the area of
concessions, thus abetting the
tendency to have overly large
concession areas.
2. Certain policies encourage rent-
seeking behaviour and thus
undermine incentives for long-term
management. The rate of royalty
payment to the government is low,
meaning that concessionaries are
able to capture a large share of the
potential rent of concession. William
noted that based to Thiele, “high
potential excess profits encourage
‘rent seeking’ activities in acquiring
concession and open the way for
corruption so that the enforcement of
concession agreement is endangered.
3. There is insufficient support for
provincial level protection of forests.
Provincial-level governments receive
a low share of royalty fees collected
by the national government which, as
explained above, are already quite
low. The World Bank explains that
“governments in provinces with
extensive forest cover may be
encouraged to replace forest with
other forms of land use more able to
generate revenue at the provincial, or
at least provide more income
opportunities to communities living
near the forests whose income might
otherwise become a burden on
provincial resources”.
Illegal logging gives a very big
impact to the economics, for example in
Kota Waringin Timur and district of Bureau
in Kalimantan. New initiatives arising since
the fall of Suharto and an attempt to
decentralize power to the district
governments, have allowed district
government to take benefit from the
informal timber sector. This is most obvious
in this district where the local government
generated a considerable amount of revenue
by taxing “illegal” carriers of timber. In the
three months of April, May, June 2000, the
regent was able to generate approximately
US$2,5 million by taxing illegal carriers of
timber coming out of Kotawaringin Timur.
In Berau, the district government has been
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able to generate a comparatively small
amount of US$444,000 from IPPK
concession holders due to the fact that the
imposed tax rate was far lower than the rate
imposed in Kotawaringin Timur. But while
less income was generated, the US$444,000
accounted for 50% of Bureau’s gross
domestic product (PAD), generated within
the district in the year 2000. Small
concessions holders have also been able to
generate a great deal of informal income
through the initial IPPK application process
(US$125,000) and from issuing SKSHH
letters to sawmill (US$55,000).
But while both district governments
are undoubtedly benefiting from the
legalization of “illegal” logging, the current
rate of exploitation is far from sustainable.
This means that these local governments
will only be able to pay benefit financially
from timber exploitation, both “illegal” and
“legal”, for the next five to ten years. They
will then have to find other ways to generate
district income. In both of the districts
discussed in this paper, local government is
hoping to convert forest land to oil palm
once it has been logged to ensure that there
is an established revenue generating industry
once production forest have been depleted.
They are therefore making efforts to attract
investors to the area in the hope that oil
palm will provide a key revenue source after
the region’s national capital has been
depleted. While the political and economic
situation in Indonesia remains unstable,
however, investors have been reluctant to
establish oil palm plantations in remote
areas such as Kotawaringin Timur and
Berau. World oil palm prices also
significantly declined in recent years making
the oil palm sectors less attractive to
investors. It is therefore unlikely that a
viable oil palm industry will be established
in these two districts before timber resources
become depleted.
Moreover, at the national level,
“illegal” logging is thought to be costing the
national government US$2,0 billion per
annum, without considering losses in terms
of ecological costs. Some estimates place
the total annual loss to the country from
“illegal” logging over 1980-1985. While
some of this revenue is now going to local
people and district governments, it seems
likely that the great majority is continuing to
fall into the hands of privileged and well-
connected elite. This situation undermines
national government efforts to implement
effective law enforcement and to promote
sustainable forest management. It also
undermines national government efforts to
maintain control over district government
decisions to generate tax from “illegal”
logging activities.
THE GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND
DEMAND
Illegal logging happened in
Indonesia has become a general secret that it
supported by the civilian and military
officials. Illegal timber brokers flourish
throughout the country, supplying wood
processors who cannot obtain adequate
supplies legally. Official involvement in
illegal logging has become so blatant and
widespread that provincial legislators in
Sumatera’s, Jambi province felt obliged to
make a public appeal to military, police, and
justice officials to stop supporting illegal
loggers operations. The Indonesia Plywood
Association (Apkindo) complained in June
2000 that illegal loggers in Sumatera and
Kalimantan were exporting at least 1 million
m3 of timber to China and undercutting the
legal export markets.
The situation happened because of
Indonesia has pursued a policy of aggressive
expansion in the forest products sector with
insufficient regard for the long term
sustainability of supply. Indonesia’s annual
log production rose from about 11 million
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m3 in the 1970s to a peak of about 36
million m3 in the early 1990s. More rapid
expansion occurred in the processed wood
products sector as the government
encouraged a shift away from the production
of lower value unprocessed logs toward
value added products. The first boom was in
plywood production, which took off during
the 1980s and 1990s as part of the country’s
drive to increase exports. Production has
declined at the economic crisis of 1997,
although startling data discrepancies exist
among different sources.
The pulp and paper industries have
grown even more dramatically. Since the
late 1980s, production capacity has
increased nearly 700 percent. Indonesia has
become the world’s ninth largest pulp
producer and eleventh largest paper
producer. This prodigious investment in
plywood, pulp and paper processing
capacity has far outpaced efforts to develop
adequate feedstock for plantations and the
industry expansion has come largely at the
expense of the country’s natural forests.
Table 2. Estimated “Legal” and “Illegal” Log Production in East Kalimantan, 2000
Industry
Official, log legal
production illegal log production
Estimated real
production
Total
unit
(HPH)
official
production
(m3/year)
Total
unit
(camps)
illegal
production
(m3/year)
unit Production(m3/year)
Berau 8 798,000 180 160,000 194 958,000
Malinau 10 422,540 31 17,000 41 439,540
Pasir 3 74,578 114 94,000 117 168,578
Total 21 1,295,118 331 271,000 352 1,566,118
Source: Bappeda and BPS (2000) in From New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting Dynamics
of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia
From the table above we see that in
the year 2000 the total illegal logging camps
331 units found in Berau (180 unit), Malinau
(31 unit), Pasir (114 unit). These illegal
logging camps estimated to have production
around 271,000 m3/year in 2000 or close to
quarter of official production around 1,3
million  m3/year. Because of the district
government loose their revenue because of
the illegal logging, than the government
trying to document and acknowledge its
existence. Until recently, provincial and
district office only kept production and
export statistics on legal logging activities.
In March 2000, the provincial forest
department reported that there was six
legally recognized mills producing plywood,
315 sawmills producing sawn timber and 22
mills producing moulding in central
Kalimantan. These mills consumed a total of
around 1.5 million m3 of timber between
January 2000 (forestry department on; From
New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting
Dynamics of “Illegal” Logging in
Kalimantan, Indonesia). Most of the
sawmills could be found in Kotawaringin
Timur, Kotawaringin Barat, and Kapuas.
These mills were thought to have consumed
at least 155,750 m3 of timber between
January 1999 and January 2000This is
approximately 11% of the total timber
volume consumed by official sawmills
operating in Central Kalimantan berween
January 1999 and January 2000, look at
table 3 (From New order to Regional
Autonomy Shifting Dynamics of “Illegal”
Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia).
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Table 3. Estimated “legal” and “illegal” timber production in Central Kalimantan, 2000
industry
production official, legalproduction Illegal production Estimated realproduction
capacity
(M3/year)
Total
unit
official
production
(m3/year)
Total
unit
illegal
production
(m3/year)
Total
unit
Production
(m3/year)
Sawmill 1,660,706 315 757,569 190 155,750 505 913,319
Plywood 495,000 6 628,325 n.a n.a 6 628,325
Moulding 276,070 22 92,851 n.a n.a 22 92,851
Total 2,431,776 343 1,478,745 n.a 155,750 533 1,634,495
Source: Bappeda and BPS (2000) in From New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting Dynamics
of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia
THE SIMILAR STUDY
Research done by Christopher Barr
and his partners in Malinau Districts, East
Kalimantan also found that after
decentralization the forest area decrease.
This research doing by made some interview
with the government official, logging
companies, and also the community. The
research found that one of the causes the
reducing of the forest area is the concessions
given by the district government. They write
the rule pretty good, but very bad in
implementation. The policies they made is
overlapping between the policies from the
central government, and between district
government. Many logging company feel
confused which rule that they have to
follow. The result is many logging company
exploit more that it has to be.
They also found that the in Malinau
district illegal logging also supported by
government official, police and military.
They take the log to outside the country,
such as Malaysia and Singapore. Illegal
logging not only caused the degradation of
the forest but also the decrease to the
revenue. Policies and regulation made by the
district government still weak that cannot
prevent the forest from illegal logging.
THE FINDING OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
As we already mentioned above, that
decentralization as the government policy
tried to transferring considerable degree of
administrative and regulatory authority from
the national government to the country’s
province and district government. The issue
of decentralization driven by the district
government who never felt got some benefit
from their resources. Decentralization give
rights to the local and district government to
manage their resources and take benefit
from it.
Decentralization in Indonesia started
since late 1998. Decentralization on the
administrative followed by decentralization
of forest administration. Kalimantan is a
very good example for the decentralization
implementation at the forest administration.
Kalimantan as we know is the province in
Indonesia which very rich of forest.
Kalimantan produced a very large amount of
log. Japan is the biggest importer log from
Kalimantan. The exploitation of the forest
increased in line with the increasing of the
timber industry.
The implementation of
decentralization in Indonesia has to face the
limited capability of the institutional, from
the district government, especially the
capability to monitor the implementation of
the regulatory that conducted in the forest.
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Without monitoring systems will cause the
forest become over exploitation. Monitoring
system need the institutional responsibility,
without it what will happened is corruption
practice. Monitoring systems need a very
high cost to implement it. That’s the
problem in Indonesia, the government has
not enough money to implement monitoring
system. The result is corruption, collusion,
and nepotism.
From the economic point of view, to
implement some regulatory means a high
cost. Environmental regulations may not
only increase the cost per unit but perhaps
more important they increase fixed costs
(those costs that do not vary with how much
you produce). When fixed costs increase
substantially, it requires that a firm have a
larger output level to maintain profitability.
Thus large costs can lead to market
structures with fewer, larger firms (increased
market concentration). Firms gain larger
market shares because each is compelled to
expand production capacity in order to cover
these additional fixed costs. Unless demand
for the goods these firms produce somehow
changes, firms will merge reducing the
number of competitors and reducing the
degree of rivalry
CONCLUSION
Decentralization process in
Indonesia which started since late 1998 has
to meet the complexity problems. Illegal
logging that already occurred in Indonesia
since many years ago, wt the
decentralization era, the amount of the
illegal logging increasing. This is happened
because of the decentralization has been
done with the limited capability of the
institution of district government.
Illegal logging happened because of
the regulatory that is implemented to the
forest has no clear enough to mentioned the
rules to exploit the forest. Not only that, but
the regulatory is overlapping between
regulatory made by the central government
and the district government. The
complicated bureaucracy made many
logging company take the short way that
will give much profit to them. But in the
reality not only logging company which
doing some illegal practice, but the local
people also doing that. The reasons of the
local people do the illegal way, because of
the economic reason, that they want to have
a better live. The regulatory have the
weakness side that it I not considered about
the equity.
Illegal logging gives a very bad
impact not only to the environment, but also
to the economic side. We know that
Indonesia as the third largest forest in the
world, most of the people live depend on the
forest and forest product. Illegal logging
practice will reduce the revenue of the
district government and local people.
Regulatory to the environment take a
high cost. It means that with the
implementation of the regulatory will
increase the production costs. But the most
important is regulatory will increase the
fixed cost. This needs to be considered in
implementing some regulatory. Because
without considering about the costs, the
impact is the illegal practice will be done,
and also the corruption, collusion, and
nepotism.
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